The Sertel and van der Bellen problems (Q1059538)

Social choice mechanisms that yield, at each profile of preferences, a social choice function are often evaluated, at least in part, in terms of the properties of the choice function. In a paper of \textit{D. H. Blair}, \textit{G. Bordes}, the author and \textit{K. Suzumura} [J. Econ. Theory 13, 361-379 (1976; Zbl 0361.90005)], for example, there may be found a collection of impossibility theorems concerning social choice mechanisms that have in common weaker regularity conditions on the choice function than rationalizability by a weak ordering. Accordingly, increased understanding of these regularity conditions plays a role in social choice theory. \textit{M. R. Sertel} and \textit{A. van der Bellen} [Econometrica 47, 1367-1389 (1979; Zbl 0418.90004)] have provided a framework for organizing many of these regularity conditions, including those of Blair et al. While establishing an impressive catalog of the relationships among these regularity conditions, they left open four research questions. In this paper, these problems are solved and some related questions raised.