Analysis of a hierarchical two-person differential game (Q1064273)

A hierarchical differential two-person game is formulated, with the dynamics described by a non-linear differential equation of fairly general form, and containing the terminal payoff functions. The formalization of an antagonistic differential game introduced by \textit{N. N. Krasovskij} and \textit{A. I. Subbotin} [''Positional differential games'' (Russian) (1974; Zbl 0298.90067)] and \textit{N. N. Krasovskij} [Math. USSR, Sb. 35, 795-822 (1979; Zbl 0439.90114)] is used to determine the optimal strategies and to reveal their structure. The optimal strategies forming the Pareto point of the set of equilibrium coalition strategies, unimprovable for the upper level player are described. The basic assumptions concerning the behavior of the players go back to \textit{H. von Stackelberg} [''The theory of the market economy'', London, Hodge (1952)] and \textit{Yu. B. Germejer} [Sov. Math., Dokl. 12, 913-917 (1971; Zbl 0253.90065)], where the static model was studied.