Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information (Q1067963)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information |
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Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information (English)
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1985
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The existence of competitive equilibrium in \textit{J.-J. Laffont}'s [ibid. 10, 284-308 (1975; Zbl 0368.90018)] model of adverse selection with costly information is studied. The existence of an equilibrium with finite prices is demonstrated without unusual restrictions on preferences or the technology of information production. This is made possible by changing the way in which the behaviour of information producing agents is modelled, and allowing for some public information.
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existence of competitive equilibrium
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adverse selection
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costly information
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public information
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