ESSs with two types of players II. (Intra- and interspecific competition between haploid species) (Q1070190)

[For part I see J. Appl. Probab. 22, 1-14 (1985; Zbl 0578.92017).] The authors' study of animal behavior from an evolutionary strategic point of view is continued using a new approach to multispecies evolutionary games. The authors prove a new interpretation of the result that contestants in asymmetrical games choose pure strategies. A classification of all evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) is given in the case that there is no selection from intraspecific competition. They illustrate the case when the dimension of the strategy space is restricted as in a diallelic haploid model, for the phase portrait of the evolutionary dynamics. The previous approach is compared with the new result and to models of sex dependent selection in randomly mating diploid species.