Truth and reflection (Q1073006)

Yablo argues that we make three requirements of truth. First, truth should be strong (i.e., if p is true, then Tp should also be true, but if p is not true, for whatever reason, then Tp should be false; contrast the weak view, that Tp should have the same values as p, even in cases of truth gaps of gluts). Second, truth should be grounded (i.e., nothing is true unless something makes it true, that this something obtains prior to its doing so, and that the chain of priority thus generated should eventually terminate in the non-semantic). Third, the semantic paradoxes like the liar should be genuine paradoxes. These three are inconsistent. Yablo compares the fixed point semantics of Kripke with the stability semantics of Herzberger, Gupta, and Belnap. Their strengths and weaknesses are largely complementary. Yablo's own proposal, stage semantics, endeavors to combine the strengths of both. The stages are like Kripke's points but converging from two sides, so that even stages are consistent and odd stages are complete. The final footnote contains a too-brief sketch of the notion of inherently true (capable of being true; not to be confused with Kripke's intrinsic truth). A possibly puzzling misprint: p. 327 line n, ''Not'' should surely read ''Now''.