A solution for two-person bargaining problems (Q1073722)

Let S be a two-person bargaining game. Let \(q^ 1(S)\) be the best possible ''natural'' outcome for player 1, \(q^ 2(S)\) for player 2, \(E(S):=q^ 1(S)+q^ 2(S)\). The solution G(S) i.e. the intersection of the Pareto boundary with the line through the disagreement point and E(S), is characterized by means of a monotonicity property w.r.t. inclusion under fixed E(S). The Nash, Kalai, Smorodinsky, Perles- Maschler, and G-solution are examined concerning continuity w.r.t. the Hausdorff metric. Risk sensitivity, domination of E(S), and the author's ''risk rationality'' are also studied.