Intension, designation, and extension (Q1076007)

This paper presents a semantical theory for free S5 in all finite types. It is a modal system which allows quantification over individuals, propositions, properties of individuals, properties of propositions, etc. without limit. As a free logic it does not presuppose that any individuals exist or that singular terms stand for anything. In this theory, statements A and B may express distinct propositions even when \(\square (A\equiv B)\) is true. The theory postulates one proposition, the Russell proposition, which is its own negation; nevertheless the system is consistent. (This is not proved, of course.) Unlike theories of Frege and Montague, in this account expressions may have not only intension and extension, but a middle category, designation. The intension of an expression determines its designation if it has one; the designation or a default determines its extension. A formula designates a proposition if anything, but it may not designate anything, and even if it does, that might not determine the truth-value (extension) of the formula. These, and other, semantical categories are defined within a framework of possible worlds and functions on them. Because of the richness of the system, no complete axiomatization of it is possible. The original purpose for developing this theory, and the richness of its language and the distinctions it draws, was to formalize Descartes' ontological argument for the existence of God. Although the formalization is not given here, or its evaluation, it is asserted that Descartes' argument is not valid.