The completeness theorems for some intuitionistic epistemic logics in terms of interval semantics (Q1078165)

In this paper several modal logics are considered which are based on an intuitionistic rather than on the classical propositions calculus and which do not contain the rule of necessitation (RN): If \(\vdash A\), then \(\vdash \square A\). Adopting ideas developed by S. Kripke (''non-normal'' possible worlds) and by I. L. Humberstone and P. Röper (''interval semantics''), the author presents a new, combined semantics with respect to which the above-mentioned systems are shown to be consistent, complete, and decidable (via the finite model property). The motive for investigating these non-normal systems (which the author refers to as ''epistemic'' logics) seems to be misguided. The author thinks that RN ''Philosophically speaking... means that what is assertoric is what is necessary. For example, if it rains today, then it necessarily rains.'' (p. 671) This, however, is a gross misunderstanding; what RN actually means is only that if A is provable, then so is \(\square A\). Hence, only if it would be logically provable that it is raining today, then it would also be provable that, necessarily, it is raining today.