Resource extraction and market structure (Q1083983)

This is a useful and compact monograph on the extraction of resources. It begins (Chapter 1) with a review of such models where the market is assumed to be either monopolistic or competitive and where there is full information. Hotelling's classic treatment provides a covenient starting point. Various refinements are also considered. Chapter 2 considers the same problem with a relaxation viz., the assumption of full information is replaced by one of uncertainty regarding the size of the resource stock, future technologies or the cost of developing a substitute. Chapter 3 introduces some results from differential games specifically, conditions necessary for an open loop and sufficient for closed loop Nash equilibria are presented. Chapter 4 discusses models of duopoly in the context of an exhaustible resources market. Price and quantity strategies are discussed as are open loop and closed loop controls. Cartelisation of the market is also considered. The final chapter, Chapter 5, provides an oligopoly model of a resource market. The tools from differential games are used to compare results of this paper with earlier chapters and to derive implications for price and quantity strategies. Open loop Nash strategies are determined by means of an algorithm.