A story semantics for implication (Q1087864)

A key idea of story semantics is that stories can be used to provide a semantics for implication. ''That A implies that B'' [A\(\to B]\) is true if for the actual world and all stories wherever A is true, B is true. Stories themselves are viewed as sets of sentences assembled under certain constraints. A is true in the story s iff \(A\in s\). The foregoing is the evaluation rule for stories; evaluation rules for the actual world are the usual. While story semantics can accomodate a wide variety of theorems, the motivating intuitions are: (i) not everything is settled in every story and (2) not everyone and everything figures in every story. Thus \(A\vee B\) can be true in a story that fails to specify that A is true and that B is true, (\(\exists x)A\) may be true when for no constant t is Ax/t true. A may be true without \(A\vee B\) being true, \(A\wedge \sim A\) may be true without B being true, A may be true without \(B\vee \sim B\) being true, and (\(\forall x)A\) may be true without Ax/t being true for all constants t (in all but the first of these B[t] may import into a story an entity or entities that do not belong there). A model consists of an actual world and a set of stories. Semantics are provided for propositional, modal, predicate, and first-order axiomatics and completeness is proved in each case.