Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications (Q1090262)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4006019
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| English | Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4006019 |
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Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications (English)
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1987
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In the first part of this paper [see the preceding review], we proposed the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition- proof Nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. This paper undertakes applications to several economic problems, including the behavior of Cournot oligopolists, oligopolistic entry deterrence, cooperation in finite horizon games, and social choice rule implementation.
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coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
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Cournot oligopolists
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oligopolistic entry deterrence
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cooperation in finite horizon games
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social choice rule implementation
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0.9184563755989076
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0.8701373934745789
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0.8545243144035339
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0.8542332649230957
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0.8484779596328735
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