Rational budgeters in the theory of social choice (Q1090584)

This paper views budget correspondences as dual to choice correspondences and investigates duality in social choice theory. Let X be a nonempty set of alternatives, \(B\subseteq X\) be a budget set, and \({\mathcal B}\) be the family of budget sets. Each individual \(i\in I\) has a preference relation \(\preccurlyeq_ i\) over B, while \(\preccurlyeq_ D\) is the social preference relation derived from individual preference relations. A budget correspondence is a mapping \(b: x\to {\mathcal B}\) satisfying \(\forall x\in X:\) \(b(x)\subseteq A(x)=\{B\in {\mathcal B}| x\in B\}\). b is rational iff: \(\forall x\in X\), \(b(x)=\{B\in A(x)| \forall B'\in A(x):\) \(B\preccurlyeq_ DB'\}\). The usual axioms and conditions in the Arrow framework can be readily formulated in terms of budget correspondences. For instance, the Pareto condition is: \(\forall B^ 1,B^ 2\in {\mathcal B}\), [\(\forall i\in I\), \(B^ 1\prec_ iB^ 2]\Rightarrow [\forall x\in X:\) \(B^ 1,B^ 2\in A(x)\Rightarrow B^ 2\not\in b(x)].\) If the domain of comparison is the family of competitive budget sets, then for any two alternatives x,y\(\in X\), the set \(\{\) x,y\(\}\) need not be a budget set. This problem is avoided here by assuming that any two budget sets \(B^ 1,B^ 2\in {\mathcal B}\) can be compared, i.e. \(\forall B^ 1,B^ 2\in {\mathcal B}\), \(\exists x\in X\) s.t. \([B^ 1\in b(x)\) and \(B^ 2\in A(x)]\) or \([B^ 2\in b(x)\) and \(B^ 1\in A(x)].\) With this assumption, the paper goes on to prove the dual version of the Arrow Theorem and another impossibility theorem using positive association. These results are not surprising in view of the rather mechanical way in which the original axioms and structural assumptions have been translated in the ''dual'' framework.