A Routley-Meyer semantics for converse Ackermann property (Q1091381)

This paper presents a series of systems of positive propositional logic which have the converse Ackermann property (CAP), viz. that no formula of the form (A\(\to B)\to C\) is provable unless C contains either an \(\to\) or the propositional constant \({\mathfrak t}\) (the conjunction of all truths). These systems belong for the most part to the framework of relevance logics of Anderson-Belnap. They are defined axiomatically - the chief modification of the stronger Anderson-Belnap systems being to restrict the axiom schemata for contraction and assertion, (A\(\to (A\to B))\to (A\to B)\) and either (t\(\to B)\to B\) or \(A\to ((A\to B)\to B)\) to cases where \(B=C\to D\). This modification achieves CAP. Possible world semantics in the manner of Routley-Meyer is then defined for these systems, and they are proved to be semantically consistent and complete.