Principles of reflection and second-order logic (Q1097275)

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Principles of reflection and second-order logic
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    Principles of reflection and second-order logic (English)
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    1987
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    Second order logic (ordinarily) means inference applied to statements with set quantifiers over, say, D when the latter are understood to range over the full power set \({\mathcal P}D\) of D. Fittingly, this is rarely used since collections of sets not closed under \({\mathcal P}\)- have been discovered to - lend themselves better to theory; for example, when in Dedekind's axioms for \({\mathbb{R}}\) the set quantifier ranges only over the semi-algebraic sets of the domain considered. This discovery is obscured by emphasizing the incompleteness of formal rules for second order logic (especially since most mathematicians do not know rules for elementary logic either). However, second order logic is useful for stating the facts involved in independence results, for example, in a striking difference between the independence of, say, the parallel postulate and of Gödel sentences. The author points out another memorable use in the area of reflection principles; fittingly, since this is implicit in such terminology as `\(\Pi^ 1_ 1\) reflection' and `\(\Pi^ 1_ 1\) indescribability' where the superscript refers to (iterations of) \({\mathcal P}\). The reviewer is not satisfied with the (introductory) discussion where not only sets, called by Cantor `Einheit' \((=\) grasped as a unity), but also predicates with indefinite extension, dubbed `Vielheit', say, V, turn up; specifically, in connection with (validity in) first order logic, where \({\mathcal P}\) is, of course, not relevant. But how is \({\mathcal P}\) to be extended to those V in general? For instance, in second-order logic. For the record, the reviewer's instinctive answer is implicit in the explanation of \(\eta\), in the theory of classes, given by Bernays (but not exploited in his axioms): the V are always predicates of unities only (not of any indefinite extension), and so \({\mathcal P}V\), though itself of indefinite extension, holds only for sets contained in V. Similarly, the singleton operation - as it were, embracing \((=\) grasping) its arguments - is defined (non-vacuously) only for sets.
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    second order logic
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    reflection principles
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