Relevant predication. I: The formal theory (Q1099150)

In philosophical discussions an informal distinction is often drawn between properties and relations that are, in some sense, intrinsic to their objects and those that are not. This paper proposes a formal characterization of such intrinsic notions in terms of relevant predication. An object, a, has the property F relevantly - \((\rho^ xFx)a\) - iff \(\forall x(x=a\to Fx),\) where \(\to\) is a relevant implication. (Any relevant implication would probably do, though this paper works with the Anderson Belnap system R; and a number of the particular properties of \(\rho\) established depend on permutation, the characteristic principle of R.) Objects a and b are relevantly related by relation R iff \((\rho^ y(\rho^ xRxy)a)b\). A number of properties of these notions are established and a second part of the paper containing philosophical applications is promised. However, it is doubful that these notions will serve for a number of the uses to which intrinsic notions have been put. The inference `Socrates is shorter than Plato. Hence, if \(x=Socrates\) then x is shorter, than Plato'. seems relevantly sound. (Cf. the inference \(1^\wedge\), p. 350.) Thus, being shorter than Plato is a relevant property of Socrates. If it were an intrinsic property it would make the ``Cambridge change'' that occurs to Socrates when Plato shrinks, a real change. Similarly, being shorter than is a relevant relation holding between Socrates and Plato; but it is certainly not an internal relation in the traditional sense.