Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development (Q1117149)

The paper corrects a mistake concerning sufficient conditions for evolutionary stability in an earlier paper of the author [ibid. 5, 269- 363 (1983; Zbl 0534.90095)]. A new kind of decomposition of a symmetric extensive two-person game into a `top' and an `abridgement' is introduced. It is shown that regularity of a direct ESS imply a robustness property with respect to small payoff changes called essentiality. On the basis of the result on regularity and essentiality sufficient conditions for a regular limit ESS are obtained. These conditions make use of the decomposition into `top' and `abridgement'. Finally it is proved that the sufficient conditions are satisfied for the many-period models with ritual fights and escalated conflicts introduced in the earlier paper.