A new informational base for social choice (Q1124505)
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English | A new informational base for social choice |
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A new informational base for social choice (English)
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1989
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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that a non-manipulable social choice function is dictatorial is based on complete orderings of alternatives by voters. This paper proves a similar result based on complete orderings of sets of alternatives by voters. In that case, non-manipulability implies the existence of a one-third minority coalition of voters that can prevent a particular alternative from being chosen.
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non-manipulable social choice function
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non-manipulability
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minority coalition
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