Social choice and the closed convergence topology (Q1176433)

This paper revisits the aggregation theorem of the author [Adv. Math. 37, 165-176 (1980; Zbl 0446.90004)], replacing the original smooth topology by the closed convergence topology and responding to several comments of N. Baigent, P. Huang, M. LeBreton and J. Uriarte. Theorems 1 and 2 establish the contractibility of three spaces of preferences: the space of strictly quasiconcave preferences \(P_{SCO}\), its subspace of smooth preferences \(P^ S_{SCO}\), and a space \(P_ 1\) of smooth (not necessarily convex) preferences with a unique interior critical point (a maximum). The results are proven using both the closed convergence topology and the smooth topology. Because of their contractibility, these spaces satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of the author and \textit{G. M. Heal} [J. Econ. Theory 31, 68-87 (1983; Zbl 0519.90012)] for aggregation rules satisfying my axioms, which are valid in all topologies. Theorem 4 constructs a family of aggregation rules satisfying my axioms for these three spaces. What these spaces have in common is a unique maximum (or peak). This rather special property makes them contractible, and thus amenable to aggregation. However, these aggregation rules cannot be extended to the whole space of preferences \(P\) which is not contractible and therefore does not admit continuous aggregation rules satisfying anonymity and unanimity [see the author, loc. cit. and Q. J. Econ. 97, 337-352 (1982; Zbl 0479.90018)].