Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games (Q1176577)
From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games |
scientific article |
Statements
Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games (English)
0 references
25 June 1992
0 references
A stochastic game is a dynamic programming situation (with infinite horizon) in which more than one decision maker influences the path the system follows, each decision maker (= player) receiving his own immediate reward. In this paper three nonlinear programming problems are given which solve the following problems. A solution of the first NLP gives an equilibrium strategy for \(\beta\)-discounted \(n\)-person stochastic games. The solvability of the second NLP is equivalent with the existence of stationary equilibrium strategies for \(n\)-person limiting average stochastic games. Finally, the authors give an NLP for finding \(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategies for 2-person zero-sum stochastic games under the limiting average payoff criterium. The authors do not discuss the question how the rather complicated NLP's can be solved.
0 references
\(\beta\)-discounted \(n\)-person stochastic games
0 references
existence of stationary equilibrium strategies
0 references
\(n\)-person limiting average stochastic games
0 references
\(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategies
0 references
0 references