Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games (Q1176577)

From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games
scientific article

    Statements

    Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    25 June 1992
    0 references
    A stochastic game is a dynamic programming situation (with infinite horizon) in which more than one decision maker influences the path the system follows, each decision maker (= player) receiving his own immediate reward. In this paper three nonlinear programming problems are given which solve the following problems. A solution of the first NLP gives an equilibrium strategy for \(\beta\)-discounted \(n\)-person stochastic games. The solvability of the second NLP is equivalent with the existence of stationary equilibrium strategies for \(n\)-person limiting average stochastic games. Finally, the authors give an NLP for finding \(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategies for 2-person zero-sum stochastic games under the limiting average payoff criterium. The authors do not discuss the question how the rather complicated NLP's can be solved.
    0 references
    \(\beta\)-discounted \(n\)-person stochastic games
    0 references
    existence of stationary equilibrium strategies
    0 references
    \(n\)-person limiting average stochastic games
    0 references
    \(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategies
    0 references

    Identifiers