Similarity of games with incomplete information (Q1177227)

This paper studies information topologies in games with incomplete information. It introduces a notion of a partition model of incomplete information, where players' uncertainty is described by a partition (\(\sigma\)-field) of the underlying state space, and demonstrates that a partition formulation is equivalent to the standard type-space representation of uncertainty in games with incomplete information. The author shows that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is upperhemicontinuous with respect to the Boylan topology on information structures [\textit{E. Boylan}, Ann. Math. Stat. 42, 552-559 (1971; Zbl 0218.60049)] provided that the information is absolutely continuous. This result does not hold for the topology of pointwise convergence of information structures. The paper also contains an approximation result. Provided that the absolute continuity assumption holds, there is for every \(\epsilon>0\) a game with a finite information structure such that any Nash equilibrium of the finite game is within \(\epsilon\) (in the metric of weak* convergence) of a Nash equilibrium of the original game.