Lexicographic domination in extensive games (Q1179438)

Consider a normal form game, and a given and fixed strategy combination for that game. A player's strategy ``lexicographically dominates'' another strategy of that player iff it yields higher utility than the alternative strategy for all completely mixed strategies of the other players that are in a neighbourhood of the given strategy combination. Call a strategy combination ``lexicographically undominated'' if it does not involve lexicographically dominated strategies. Finally, in a finite extensive game, call a strategy combination ``lexicographically undominated'' if it is lexicographically undominated in the agent normal form of that game. In this paper the author begins by providing some simplified characterisations of lexicographically undominated strategies in finite extensive games. Next, the author notes that in finite extensive games perfect equilibrium points are lexicographically undominated. The main result then is that in finite extensive games lexicographically undominated strategy combinations are subgame-perfect equilibrium points.