On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values (Q1179447)

Cooperative games with transferable utilities are considered. As game solution the concept of the Shapley value and its generalizations are adapted. Several differential characterizations of these notions by means of various axioms are known from the scientific literature. The author suggests and studies an axiom of coalitional strategies equivalence (CSE). The CSE axiom means that adding a constant to the worths of all coalitions containing a given coalition \(T\) does not affect the payoffs of the players that do not belong to the coalition \(T\). The axiom is implied by the marginality axiom and also by both dummy and additivity axioms. Thus it gives the possibility to get the following new characterization results. A value satisfies the efficiency, positivity, homogeneity, partnership and the CSE axioms if and only if it is a weighted Shapley value. A value satisfies efficiency, symmetry, CSE if and only if it is the Shapley value. A relation with other characterizations is discussed. Some examples on the influence of various other axioms are given.