Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal theory of time (Q1249385)

Noting that, while physics seems to require the defining of temporal relations in terms of causal ones, empiricist theories of causation adopt the contrary point of view, von Bretzel attempts here to devise a theory of causation which neither requires temporal features nor is inconsonant with the needs of a scientific philosophy. Reichenbach's probabilistic theory of causation (as expounded in 'The Direction of Time') is discussed, and, because of its emphasis on temporal features, is found to be unacceptable. Nevertheless, by using Reichenbach's notion of a conjunctive fork, von Bretzel shows that causes may be distinguished from events by an appropriate (non-temporal) definition of ordering the events of the causal net. Possible objections -- either to probabilistic theories of causation in general, or to the use of such theories in the construction of the causal theory of time -- and replies to such objections are then discussed. A more serious objection concerns the ability of von Bretzel's theory to distinguish between the causal processes and pseudo-causal processes. It is concluded that genuine conjunctive forks whose members are events of a pseudo-process do not exist. The nature and importance of causal interactions are then explored, and it is shown that, without interactions, common causes would not exist, and hence no explanations of coincident statistical relevances or direction to either causal processes or time would be forthcoming.