ZS-value for random coalition games (Q1262824)

Let \(N=\{1,2,...,n\}\) be a set of players; each nonempty subset of N is a coalition. An n-person game on N is a real-valued function v on \(2^ N\) with \(v(\emptyset)=0\). If v is symmetric in the sense that v(T) depends only on the number of elements in T, the Shapley value for each player is the same, and so is the Banzhaf-Coleman value. The present authors want to allow different coalition formation probabilities, with or without the above symmetry in v, with the result that even in the presence of such symmetry different players may be assigned different values. The ZS-value is defined with this aim by two axioms, and Theorem 2 asserts that there is a unique function on the set of all games on N satisfying these axioms. The ZS-value is compared with the Shapley value and the B-C value in an example. The paper suffers from lack of careful proof-reading. In some instances one can guess the intended meaning, but there are others where the reviewer was unable to do so.