Information and impossibilities (Q1276417)

The author outlines a theory called informationalism. The presentation of informationalism is based on a discussion of the notion of possibility. Stalnaker's moderate modal realism is adopted, according to which possible worlds are ways things might have been. The question is raised whether there are also ways things could not have been. If propositions are indentified with sets of possible worlds, then every impossible proposition is represented by the empty set, an account that does not do justice to the fact that we may have different attitudes towards impossible propositions expressed by different sentences. Moreover, if sentences true in every possible world have null information content, then every mathematical truth has null information content. Whereas Stalnaker rejects the notion of impossible world, the familiar idea that an increase of information corresponds to an elimination of possibilities brings the author to countenancing impossible worlds (understood as ways things could not have been). It is noted that the available information and the possibilities may change and hence depend on a context in some way or other. The states of a given inquiry depend on the subject matter and issues regarded as relevant to the inquiry. A state is a way of resolving all relevant issues. If a state is incompatible with the available information, it is an impossible state, otherwise it is a possible state. Taking into account the inverse relation between the available information and the set of possibilities makes it possible, for instance, to envisage a situation in which the relevant information is such that it does not preclude round squares. Moreover, the author claims that ``full-fledged imagining is an infallible guide to at least a kind of possibility'', where the kind of possibility also depends on the available information. In the final section informationalism is outlined as a mathematical theory based on the notions of an information context and an informational modal framework. The paper may be seen as an interesting and useful contribution to making impossible worlds more respectable in philosophical logic and related areas. Unfortunately, the references to other work on non-normal worlds are incomplete. Barwise points out that the notion of impossible state ``can be useful for characterizing the beliefs of those of us who are less than logically omniscient''. The application of non-normal worlds in epistemic logic in order to overcome closure under logical consequence and other descriptively inadequate properties of the notion of belief in standard systems of epistemic logic has been dealt with, for instance, also by \textit{V. Rantala} [Acta Philos. Fenn. 35, 106-115 (1982; Zbl 0519.03002); Stud. Log. 41, 41-65 (1982; Zbl 0529.03004)], \textit{J. Hintikka} [J. Philos. Log. 4, 475-484 (1975; Zbl 0334.02003)], \textit{H. Wansing} [Z. Math. Log. Grundl. Math. 35, 551-557 (1989; Zbl 0685.03012); Stud. Log. 49, 523-539, 50, 359 (1990/91; Zbl 0744.03028)], \textit{E. Thijsse} [Partial logic and knowledge representation (Delft, (1992)] and \textit{E. Thijsse}, and \textit{H. Wansing} [J. Appl. Non-Class. Log. 6, 127-136 (1996; Zbl 0849.03012)].