What is computation? (Q1293030)

In this paper the author considers an objection to Turing's 1936 famous analysis of the concept of computation which exists in the philosophical literature. The trust of the objection is that although Turing's account may be necessary but it is not sufficient. If it is taken to be sufficient then too many entities turn out to be computers. The aim of the paper is to meet the objection. The author indicates that ``to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture.'' The key issue is to delimit the phrase ``of a certain kind''. The author notes that prominent attempts to deal with the problem involve modification of Turing's analysis, and that this is both undesirable and unnecessary. The author attempts to uphold the sufficiency of Turing's analysis.