Second thoughts around some of Gödel's writings: A non-academic option (Q1299778)

This paper, originally commissioned as a Review Essay on volume III of \textit{Gödel}'s ``Collected Works'' [ed. \textit{S. Feferman}, Oxford University Press: New York (1995; Zbl 0826.01038)], gives second thoughts on Gödel's philosophy of mathematics in the light of TENOS (tested experience, not only speculation about possibilities). These thoughts, supplemented by autobiographical remarks and with references to several of the author's reviews for the ``Zentralblatt'' (such as Zbl 0522.03046, Zbl 0728.03031, Zbl 0795.03083, Zbl 0815.03036, Zbl 0820.03001), concern \textit{Bourbaki}'s foundational approach, \textit{Wittgenstein}'s ideas on foundations with a report on the author's conversations with Wittgenstein on Gödel's proof, Gödel's notion of reductive proof, the notion of recursiveness with its epistemological bearings, the views of Gödel and \textit{Turing} concerning the strong thesis of Artificial Intelligence, and the role of intuition in mathematics presented as Gödel's rehabilitation of \textit{Kant}. In an appendix the author gives ``Logical complements in the light of TENOS'' discussing among other topics the notions of completeness and incompleteness, \textit{Hilbert}'s \(\varepsilon\)-notation, formal semantics, the logical background of Diophantine problems and transfinite arithmetic.