Modal logics with the MacIntosh rule (Q1316410)

This paper explores some of the territory of normal modal logics containing the so-called MacIntosh rule: If \(\vdash \diamondsuit A\to A\), then \(\vdash A\to \square A\), is admissible, at least for some formulas \(A\). Call these \(M\)-logics. Where \(K\) is the smallest normal modal logic and \(D=K+ \vdash \diamondsuit \top\) and \(\overline{D}= K+ \vdash \square \bot\), and so for other familiar modal axioms, it then turns out that \(D\cap \overline{D}\) is the smallest \(M\)-logic. Further, the intersection of any two \(M\)-logics is an \(M\)-logic. Any normal system containing the Brouwerische axiom \(\vdash A\to \square \diamondsuit A\) is an \(M\)-logic; indeed any normal system containing its generalization \(\vdash A\to \square \diamondsuit^ n A\), \(n\geq 0\), is an \(M\)-logic. \(D\) is an \(M\)- logic; so is T. S.4, however, is not. Hence not every extension of an \(M\)-logic is an \(M\)-logic. Genuine \(M\)-logics are those containing \(\vdash \diamondsuit A\to A\) (and to \(\vdash A\to \square A\)) for some \(A\), but either \(\sim \diamondsuit A\) nor \(\square A\). S.5 is genuine; \(\overline{D}\) is not. No \(M\)-logic is genuine if it contains either the disjunction rule: If \(\vdash \square A_ 1 \vee\dots\vee \square A_ n\) then \(\vdash A_ i\) for some \(1\leq i\leq n\), or the rule of margins: If, for some \(A\), \(\vdash A\to \square A\) (or \(\vdash \diamondsuit A\to A\)) then either \(\vdash A\) or \(\vdash\sim A\), although any system with the rule of margins is an \(M\)-logic.