Absolutely expedient algorithms for learning Nash equilibria (Q1322380)

Consider an \(n\)-person non-zero sum game \(\Gamma\) with finite pure strategy spaces \(S_ i\) for the players \((1\leq i\leq n)\), where for each pure strategy vector \(\bar s= (s_ 1,\dots, s_ n)\) in \(S_ 1\times S_ 2\times\cdots\times S_ n\), the payoff function of the \(i\)th player \(f_ i(\bar s)\) is a realization \(x_ i\) of a random variable with a probability distribution \(F(\cdot| \bar s,i)\) on \([0,1]\). It is assumed that all the distributions \(F(\cdot| \bar s, i)\) for all \(\bar s\) and \(i\) are unknown to the players, and player \(i\) knows only the realization \(x_ i\), \(1\leq i\leq n\). Consider now such a game with incomplete information, where the players repeat playing the game \(\Gamma\) infinitely many times. The author shows that there is a ``learning algorithm'', which allows all the players to improve their starting strategies in such a way that they converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game \(\Gamma\). For this purpose a team concept associated with learning automata models is employed.