Strict Fregean free logic (Q1325777)

Systems of so-called ``free logic'' are characterized by the fact that they are free of existential assumptions, i.e., in particular they admit of non-referring singular terms. The author calls a free logic ``Strict Fregean'' if it satisfies two principles; ``(i) the truth-value of the sentence is a function of [\dots] the referents of its constituent names, and (ii) functions are operations, and where there is no input to an operation, there can be no output either'' (307). The latter idea is later referred to as the NINO-principle (``No Input No Output''), and the author develops a ``Strict Fregean Free Logic'' SFFL that honors NINO. The semantics of SFFL, which is an adaptation of ideas presented in a 1966 paper by T. Smiley, gives rise to two different (strong and weak) notions of logical truth. Furthermore it yields a variety of formulae or sentences which get no truth-value (under a certain interpretation \(I\)). In particular, basic identities \(s=t\) fail to get a truth-value whenever at least one of the singular terms \(s\), \(t\) fails to refer. Also, no truth-value will be assigned either to negations of formulae that lack truth-value or to disjunctions in which at least one disjunct lacks truth-value. Accordingly, certain logical laws either of classical first- order logic or of systems of ``normal'', non-Fregean free logic fail to hold in SFFL, to wit \(t=t\) or also the much weaker \(t=t\vee t\neq t\). In a concluding section these peculiarities of SFFL are defended against alterantive treatments of non-referring terms, especially against a version of supervaluational semantics advocated by van Fraassen.