The Shapley value of resale-proof trades (Q1342658)

The paper studies the Shapley value of transferable utility games associated with resale-proof trades of information. In the symmetric case, an expression for the Shapley value is presented, whereas, in the non-symmetric case, some upper and lower bounds for the Shapley value are given. In the context of a model of technological dissemination with no assumptions of patent protection, the notion of ``resale-proofness'' is meant to formulate self-binding trades of information, such that no agent has an incentive to resell the information even when it is freely allowed. Let \(N= \{1, 2,\dots, n\}\) be the finite set of all agents, where agent 1 is the sole seller of some information and the others are potential buyers. For each \(i\in N\) and \(S\subseteq N\), let \(E_ i(S)\) be the monetary profit to agent \(i\) when \(S\) is the set of all holders of the information (that is, the set of all agents who have acquired the information). Given the current set \(H\) of the holders, where \(1\in H\subseteq N\), a resale from a coalition \(S\subseteq H\) to a coalition \(T\subseteq N\backslash H\) is said to be profitable iff \(\sum_{i\in S\cup T} E_ i(H\cup T)> \sum_{i\in S} E_ i(H)\). In an inductive manner on the number of agents in \(N\backslash H\), we say a coalition \(S\subseteq H\) has an enforceable resale to a coalition \(T\subseteq N\backslash H\) iff the resale is profitable and there is no coalition \(\overline T\subseteq H\cup T\) which has an enforceable resale to some coalition \(P\subseteq N\backslash (H\cup T)\) where, in case the coalition \(N\backslash H\) consists of one agent, we say \(S\subseteq H\) has an enforceable resale to coalition \(N\backslash H\) iff the resale is profitable. A coalition \(M\) satisfying \(1\in M\subseteq N\) is called resale-proof iff there does not exist a coalition \(S\subseteq M\) which has an enforceable resale to some coalition \(T\subseteq N\backslash M\). A coalition \(M\) is called a profitable resale-proof set iff \(M\) is resale- proof and \(\sum_{i\in M} E_ i(M)> E_ 1(\{1\})\). The associated TU-game \(v: 2^ N\to \mathbb{R}\) to the resale-proof trade market is defined as follows: if \(1\not\in S\), then \(v(S):= 0\); if \(1\in S\), then \[ v(S):= \max\Biggl[ \sum_{i\in M} E_ i(M)\mid M\subseteq S\text{ and } M\text{ is profitable resale-proof set or } M= \{1\}\Biggr]. \] So, for each coalition \(S\) containing the inventor of the information, its worth equals the sum of the monetary profits to agents of a most profitable resale-proof subset of \(S\). As a matter of fact, it is stated that the worth \(v(S)\) for any coalition \(S\) containing the inventory, is determined by the minimal profitable resale-proof subset of \(S\). Further, it is established that the Shapley value of the associated TU-game belongs to the core of the game iff there is exactly one minimal resale-proof set. Next an expression is presented for the Shapley value of symmetric games (i.e. the profits depend only on the size of the set of information holders, that is for all \(S, R\in 2^ N\) with \(1\in S\cap R\) and \(| S|= | R|\), we have \(E_ 1(S)= E_ 1(R)\) and also \(E_ i(S)= E_ j(R)\) if \(i\in S\), \(j\in R\), and \(i, j\neq 1\). Finally, some upper and lower bounds for the Shapley value for non- symmetric games are given.