Strategic description of social choice (Q1363921)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1050631
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| English | Strategic description of social choice |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1050631 |
Statements
Strategic description of social choice (English)
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1 December 1997
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I show that by modifying the social choice scheme of Arrow the restrictions of his impossibility theorem can be avoided, although his axioms of universality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and unanimity remain intact. It thus becomes possible to clarify the role of the strategic manipulation effect in the formation of additional restrictions for constructing `democratic' aggregation functions.
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democratic aggregation functions
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social choice
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impossibility theorem
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strategic manipulation
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0.8208963871002197
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0.8038107752799988
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0.8006888031959534
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0.7901225090026855
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