Axiomatic formal ontology (Q1379294)

Ontology is the science of being \(qua\) being. It is the most general study of the fundamental facts about everything that is. This book presents a formal, axiomatic theory of ontology, founded on concepts of intensional entities, viz., states of affairs and attributes (properties and relations), as well as individuals. The theory develops in four stages. Part I presents the system P, which in its primary interpretation is a theory of states of affairs and their analytic implication relations. This is essentially an ontological counterpart of classical propositional logic. It is an atomistic account in which states of affairs are construed as concrete entities, distinct from propositions, which are candidates for the intensions of declarative sentences. Thus, there are assumed to be negative, disjunctive and conjunctive states of affairs as well as basic atoms. Some, but not all, states of affairs obtain, some are merely possible, and some are not possible at all, but all are entities in the domain of the theory. Certain states of affairs are singled out: \({\mathbf t}\) is the minimal state of affairs, part of every s-o-a; \({\mathbf k}\) is the maximal s-o-a, with every s-o-a a part of it; \({\mathbf w}\) is the state of affairs of the actual world, the conjunction of all obtaining s-o-a. Possible worlds are defined as maximally consistent states of affairs. Part II reinterprets (and modifies slightly) the theory P as a theory, P+, of properties and their relations of intensional parthood. This allows explication of such concepts as existence, subsistence, substance, accident, and also various concepts of individuals, including Leibnizian and Meinongian conceptions. The theory blossoms in Part III with system PT1. This, in its primary interpretation, is a theory of states of affairs and individuals and properties of individuals. Properties are construed, in the manner of Frege, as unsaturated entities; states of affairs are saturations of properties by individuals. As before this allows the explication of many fundamental concepts such as exemplification, essence and accident, etc. It also allows for interesting contrasts with other ontological theories, notably Leibniz's theory of individuals and individual concepts and David Lewis's counterpart theory. Further, many of the basic concepts of set theory may be defined within the framework of PT1. The domain of PT1 is limited to type 1 properties, however, i.e., properties of individuals, and the individuals that saturate them and states of affairs that are their saturations. In Part IV the theory is extended to apply to entities of all types; this is the full system IOU, the theory of `universal intensional ontology'. Amongst other things, IOU incorporates principles that allow for the definition of much of general set theory, where sets are construed as particular kinds of properties. (Axiomatic set theory is not, however, included in IOU since IOU lacks the appropriate existence principles.) In all four parts the method is strictly axiomatic. The language of the theory (a first-order language throughout) is rigorously defined, axioms (which on interpretation are, for the most part, considered analytically true) are postulated, many concepts are precisely defined in terms of the primitives of the language, and theorems are formally derived. It is impressive how much can be accomplished on quite a narrow base. For convenience, an Appendix summarizes all the principles of the systems, and presents the more complicated derivations. In addition to the formal development of the systems, each chapter includes a section of comments, which discuss philosophical aspects of the concepts employed and the contrasts with other ontological theories. The work as a whole is a model of the application of formal methods to sophisticated philosophy, and must be commended for that.