The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. (Q1395323)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940685
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| English | The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940685 |
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The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. (English)
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1 July 2003
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In this paper, a general solution to the principal-agent problem is obtained under minimal constraints on the parameters of the model. The majority of studies of the principal-agent problem consider the possibility of using the first-order approach for determining the best strategy of the principal. Here, the author develops another, more general, approach to solving this problem.
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hierarchical games
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strategy
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Principal-Agent problem
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general solution
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model
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penalty control
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0.9048327207565308
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0.8365873694419861
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0.8265360593795776
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0.7948885560035706
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0.7894618511199951
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