On the inconsistency of equilibrium refinement (Q1403967)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1968051
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| English | On the inconsistency of equilibrium refinement |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1968051 |
Statements
On the inconsistency of equilibrium refinement (English)
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20 August 2003
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The author considers finite \(n\)-person games in normal form. \textit{H. Norde, J. Potters, H. Reijnierse} and \textit{D. Vermeulen} [Games and Econ. Behav. 12, No. 2, 219--225 (1996; Zbl 0848.90132)] proved that each solution concept satisfying non-emptiness, optimality, and consistency axioms coincides with the Nash equilibrium concept. Hence any refinement and selection procedures violate these axioms. First the author suggests a refinement of strict equilibria which violates non-emptiness, but determines a subclass of games for which it is still consistent. Next, he suggests a selection procedure which relies upon a weakened consistency requirement.
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non-cooperative games
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equilibrium selection
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0.9233096
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0.8987447
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0.8452518
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0.8448032
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0.8302101
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