A really fuzzy approach to the sorites paradox (Q1405838)

It is often argued that a sufficient solution of the sorites paradox may be reached if one refers to \([0,1]\)-valued ``fuzzy'' logics or some of their more recent generalizations which use integral lattice-ordered abelian monoids as their truth degree structures. On the other hand such solutions are critizised from philosophers as well as from linguists as not grasping the true core of an inherent reference to vagueness in the sorites problem. Starting from an analysis of main points of such critical comments, the author argues that a slight generalization of the comparative logics of \textit{E. Casari} [Synthese 73, 421-449 (1987; Zbl 0974.03508)], a generalization which allows for \textsl{weak} lattice-ordered pregroups (which satisfy only \(1\leq 1+1\) instead of \(1=1+1\)) as truth degree structures, is well suited not only to solve the sorites paradox, but also to have the expressive power to fit well for grasping further problems for the mathematical modelling of vagueness phenomena. An appendix mentions a Hilbert-style and a Gentzen-style axiomatization which are adequate for Casari's and the author's logics.