Representational innovation and mathematical ontology (Q1408660)

The author challenges the received view that one has to choose between mathematical content (realism) and mathematical knowledge. According to the author, there are such things as mathematical objects and we really do know, with varying degrees of precision, what they are. This position does not entail a commitment to the existence of immutable and eternal objects that are causally inert existing outside space and time. Rather, mathematical objects are real but emergent phenomena. Therefore, Platonists are right in insisting on the referentiality of mathematical terms and the reality of mathematical content. Nominalists are right to insist on the contextual nature of mathematical truth. Evidence for this view is presented by discussing the representational innovations developed during the history of the calculus. In particular, the contributions of Cavalieri, Wallis and Leibniz are considered. The conclusion the author arrives at is that the question of whether mathematical objects are created or discovered is based on the false metaphysical premise that there are two kinds of reality, the created reality and the discovered reality. Mathematical objects are like domestic felines or brewer's yeast. These organic kinds are characterized by an autonomous necessity over which we exert little control, which are the result of gradual processes of causal interactions between nature and nurture. As such, they transcend the creation-discovery distinction.