Two-person repeated games with finite automata (Q1423665)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Two-person repeated games with finite automata |
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Two-person repeated games with finite automata (English)
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7 March 2004
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Two-person repeated games are studied in which there is a bound on the complexity of strategies for only one of the players. The complexity of a strategy is defined as the smallest number of states of an automaton required to implement it. The asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs is studied as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly.
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repeated game
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finite automata
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complexity
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Nash equilibrium
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