The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation (Q1567181)

The authors show that any noncooperative game in the strategic or normal form can be represented as a canonical game in extensive form that preserves all symmetries. The reformulation from extensive form to a strategic form has been well studied in the literature. However, the reformulation of a game in the strategic form as a game in the extensive form is usually considered trivial and conceptually straight forward. In this paper the authors show that this is not true and that the choice of a representation of a strategic game by an extensive game that preserves the symmetry of the strategic game and in addition satisfies robustness under restriction and minimality of the tree involved, leads to difficult conceptual problems and deep mathematical results. Part I, see Current trends in economics, Antalya, Turkey 1997, Stud. Econ. Theory 8, 367-387 (1999; Zbl 0965.91005).