Logic, truth and the modalities. From a phenomenological perspective (Q1567500)

Jitendra Nath Mohanty is a distinguished philosopher, known for relevant contribution in the field of phenomenology, and for new insights in Indian philosophy, particularly Nyaya. The book under review is a collection of essays on four kinds of logic: formal logic, transcendental logic, speculative logic and hermeneutic logic. Mohanty has published extensively, from a phenomenological perspective, in all these kinds of logic. Although the author believes that all four logics are compatible, there is no attempt to show this. Most of the 13 essays deal with the ideas of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, and references to Frege, Lask, Heidegger and König, among others. The fact that most of the essays have originally appeared in journals does not affect a sense of unity of the book. An Introduction on ``The origin of logic'' is very useful in understanding the thought of the author. After very brief considerations about Greek logic, Hindu and Buddhist logics, Chinese logic, the author sees logic as emerging from language, learning and intellectual acts and practices. Drawing from Husserl, Heidegger, Piaget, and others, Mohanty claims that to speak of a causal origin of logic is not possible, but it is possible to speak of brain-states or neural information processing states giving rise to logic. And concludes his account on the origin of logic by saying that ``the origin of logic has to be sought in the structure of intentionality'' proximately, in the structure of the living intentions of the logician, remotely in the intentions implicated in those intentionalities down to the most basic ones. This Introduction sets the ground for the selection of the essays. Chapter 1 discusses the concept of psychologism and the arguments of Frege and Husserl against it. The main question refers to the possibility of a radical anti-psychologistic position. Chapter 2 and 3 proceeds with the discussion of Husserl and Chapters 4 and 5 with Frege. Quite interesting is, in Chapter 5, the analysis of the relations between Frege and Husserl. Chapter 6, entitled ``Heidegger on logic'', the longest of the book, begins by justifying the importance of looking into Heidegger's conception of logic. His views on Husserl, Frege and Russell and Whitehead are discussed, making it clear that a new philosophy of mathematics emerges out of Heidegger's thought. Chapter 7 on ``Josef König's distinction between theoretical and practical sentences'', and Chapter 8, on ``Lask's theory of judgment'', raise basic philosophical questions. Chapters 9, 10 and 11, constitute an account of some investigations of Mohanty on the nature of Husserl's philosophy. In Chapters 12 and 13, first published in this collection of essays, the author discusses the concepts of truth and of necessity, respectively, in Kant and Husserl. The book closes with an Index of names. The essays, put together, make this book an accessible introduction to the philosophy of logic and of mathematics from a phenomenological perspective, which, in spite of its growing importance, remains less known among mathematicians.