Auctioning divisible goods (Q1597934)

The authors' concluding remarks: ``This paper investigates auctions of divisible goods. The treasury auction environment is modeled, considering the divisible nature of the good offered for sale, the presence of noncompetitive bidding, and different degrees of price discrimination. Characterizations were provided of equilibria of auctions in which the bidders possess private information. The results show that equilibrium bid schedules in divisible good auctions contain strategic aspects and take explicit account of the `winner's curse'. In the case of symmetric bidder information it was shown that a continuum of equilibria exists for both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, and that the use of a zero reserve price eliminates all but one of those equilibria in discriminatory auctions. Explicit solutions for the equilibrium bid schedules were provided and their properties were examined. We also provided an explicit solution for a uniform-price auction with asymmetrically informed bidders. The example illustrates results from the general analysis, the symmetric information case, and from the unit auction literature. We consider a stand-alone auction. In U.S. Treasury auctions, the potentially complex interplay between the when-issued market, the auction, and the after market suggests that analysis of a stand-alone auction cannot lead to a complete understanding of this important auction environment. Further work on such issues is necessary''.