Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining (Q1651856)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901008
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| English | Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6901008 |
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Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining (English)
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10 July 2018
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Summary: We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.
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multilateral bargaining
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one-dimensional
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multiple equilibria
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time preference
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0.8056671023368835
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0.7694451808929443
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0.7635176181793213
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0.7604812979698181
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0.7592571973800659
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