Security of the Bennett-Brassard quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks (Q1662481)

Summary: The theoretical Quantum Key-Distribution scheme of \textit{C. H. Bennett} and \textit{G. Brassard} (BB84) [Theor. Comput. Sci. 560, Part 1, 7--11 (2014; Zbl 1306.81030) (revised reprint)] has been proven secure against very strong attacks including the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Though the latter are the most general attacks, collective attacks are much easier to analyze, yet, they are conjectured to be as informative to the eavesdropper. Thus, collective attacks are likely to be useful in the analysis of many theoretical and practical schemes that are still lacking a proof of security, including practical BB84 schemes. We show how powerful tools developed in previous works for proving security against the joint attack, are simplified when applied to the security of BB84 against collective attacks whilst providing the same bounds on leaked information and the same error threshold.