Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth. The role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics (Q1705452)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850674
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    Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth. The role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850674

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      Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth. The role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics (English)
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      15 March 2018
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      The book under review consists of fifteen papers both new (two papers from 1988 and 1992) and previously published in journals or collected volumes (thirteen papers). Some of the papers have been translated from Italian into English. Its main subject is the analysis of concepts developed by L. E. J. Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism, and of A. Heyting. In particular, the importance of the role of certain imaginary acts of choice performed by an ideal agent for explaining the notion of reference both in intuitionuistic as well as in classical mathematics is considered. The main problem discussed in the book is the following: to what extent succeeds the intutionism to avoid the classical realistic notion of truth? The author's answer is that a form of realism is hidden in the idealisation of Brouwer's creative subject. A critical analysis of the responses of Michael Dummett, Saul Kripke, Per Martin-Löf and Arend Heyting to Brouwer's work is provided.
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      intuitionism
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      truth
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      intuitionistic mathematics
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