At least not false, at most possible: between truth and assertibility of superlative quantifiers (Q1709132)

The problem analyzed and partially solved in the article can be formulated as follows: Classical truth-functionally, \textit{superlative quantifiers} (at most \(n\), at least \(n\)) and \textit{comparative quantifiers} (fewer than \(n+1\), more than \(n-1\)) are equivalent. On the other hand, there are many cases when superlative and comparative quantifiers do not behave classically. The author explicates the difference between truth and assertibility in order to explain the linguistic (essentially pragmatic) fact where the superlative and comparative quantifiers do not correspond to what they should according to their truth-conditions. She takes into consideration the relation of assertibility that the author characterizes the alternative assertibility conditions, which are not definable logically, as modal. Some examples show that a text with superlative/comparative quantifiers is no more logically explainable because assertivity is necessarily connected with pragmatic factors: the logical analysis is completed by external hypotheses that the reader of the text is admitted to accept. The author evidently wants to define some laws of regularity which would coerce the seeming chaos in our use of the peculiar kinds of quantifiers and defines therefore an epistemic logic where modal operators are handled differently than other expressions. The resulting system is able to explain the particular cases of their `irregularity'.