How we understand mathematics. Conceptual integration in the language of mathematical description (Q1746112)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6864020
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| English | How we understand mathematics. Conceptual integration in the language of mathematical description |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6864020 |
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How we understand mathematics. Conceptual integration in the language of mathematical description (English)
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24 April 2018
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This brief book attempts to describe mathematics in terms of cognitive linguistics' conceptual integration theory. Specifically, Woźny examines \textit{I. N. Herstein}'s [Topics in algebra. A Blaisdell Book in the Pure and Applied Sciences. New York-Toronto- London: Blaisdell Publishing Company, a division of Ginn and Company (1964; Zbl 0122.01301); 2nd ed. Lexington, TX: Xerox College Publishing (1975; Zbl 1230.00004)] through the prisms of ``conceptual blending'' and ``small spatial story''. However, the book often proceeds by making pronouncements without bothering to justify them. Here are two examples. (1) ``Mathematical entities are eternal and unchanging; they exist in a world separate from the human world, don't they? Well, unfortunately, no. Mathematics, wonderful as it is, is a product of the human mind'' (p.~37). This passage suggests that the author expects many readers to have a Platonistic perspective. But apparently those readers are to abandon that perspective just on Woźny's say-so, without being offered an argument for the untenability of Platonism. (2) ``Mathematicians \(\ldots\) always know which small spatial story should be used, but they usually do not let us know'' (p.~81). Again, this broad statement comes unaccompanied by any supporting evidence. So what should one make of the sweeping claim in the introduction that ``I will prove that the construction of meaning in mathematics relies on the iterative use of basic mental operations of \textsl{story} and \textsl{blending} and demonstrate exactly how those two mental operations are responsible for the effectiveness and fecundity of mathematics'' (p.~3)? It would indeed be nice if, in 117 small pages, someone could incontrovertibly establish precisely how the human brain construes and processes mathematics---and definitively wrap up Wigner's issue of ``the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics'', to boot. However, one would suspect that these matters will continue to be debated for some time to come.
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conceptual integration
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blending theory
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small spatial story
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0.7884942293167114
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0.7287039160728455
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0.724966287612915
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