Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games (Q1764280)

In this paper, the authors provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and describe their symmetric Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria in the replicator dynamics is also studied. Finally, the authors discuss the concept of risk-dominance and its relation to the size of the basin of attraction in the replicator dynamics of a Nash equilibrium. See also the article by \textit{J. C. Harsányi} and \textit{R. Selten} [A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MIT Press (1988; Zbl 0693.90098)]. It is also shown that unlike in two-player games with two strategies, risk-dominant strategies may have smaller basins of attraction than dominated ones. The authors discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games and construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.