Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. (Q1810425)

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Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
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    Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. (English)
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    9 June 2003
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    The authors extend the work of Carlsson and van Damme's model to many players, many action games. The assumption was that the actions can be ranked such that there are strategic complementaries. It is shown that the limit uniqueness result can be generalized. A number of theorems, claims are presented with valid justification. No numerical experimentation is presented.
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    global games
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    supermodular games
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    equilibrium selection
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