Some properties of the core on convex geometries (Q1812289)

The author considers a game on convex geometry introduced by Bilbao as a model of cooperation structures in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form and investigate some properties of the core of a game on a convex geometry. The author shows that the core of a quasi-convex game is the unique stable set, which is an extension of the result by \textit{L. Shapley} [Int. J. Game Theory 1, 11--26 (1971; Zbl 0222.90054)] for traditional games and the core on the class of balanced games on a convex geometry has a consistency property, called the reduced game property. Finally the author axiomatize the core on the class of balanced games by means of consistency which is analogous to a result by \textit{B. Peleg} [Int. J. Game Theory 15, 187--200 (1986; Zbl 0629.90099)] for traditional cooperative games.