On a reformulation of Cournot-Nash equilibria (Q1813663)

The authors study a variant of an existence theorem of \textit{A. Mas- Colell} [J. Math. Econ. 13, 201-206 (1984; Zbl 0563.90106)] for Cournot- Nash equilibrium distributions for games with a compact metric space of actions and continuous payoffs. Attention is focussed on the preference relations rather than on the payoff functions. In particular, these preference relations satisfy reflexivity, continuity and either transitivity or a suitable convexity condition. Moreover, motivated by the idea of allowing ``externalities'' in consumption, the strategy sets may depend on the distribution of actions. For the corresponding classes of games existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions is shown. The proofs use some results on the existence of maximal elements in compact sets.